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I. INTRODUCTION
At the annual meeting of the North American Securities
Administrators Association, which represents state regulators, the
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, William H.
Donaldson, announced an “initiative to promote increased
1
cooperation between state and federal securities regulators.”
Donaldson stated that “everyone in this room is committed to
† J.D. Seton Hall University School of Law, 2004; B.A. Seton Hall University,
2001. I would like to thank Professors Timothy P. Glynn, Stephen J. Lubben, and
Charles A. Sullivan for providing me with invaluable advice and assistance in the
writing of this article.
1. Riva D. Atlas, S.E.C. Chief Plays Down Clash with State Attorneys General, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at C2.
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rooting out fraud and corruption in our markets and otherwise
2
protecting investors.” Donaldson was responding specifically to
media reports of a clash between state and federal securities
3
regulators.
Although Donaldson attempted to downplay the
4
“supposed clash,” these clashes are increasingly common. Indeed,
after stating that a commission was being formed to “study and
propose ways to improve federal and state cooperation in
significant enforcement activities,” Donaldson criticized the actions
of Oklahoma’s Attorney General, Drew Edmondson, as potentially
undermining the federal investigation and prosecution of
5
WorldCom. According to Donaldson, Edmondson is “refight[ing]
6
an old battle” and his actions could “impede and delay the
7
administration of justice.”
In late August of 2003, Edmondson filed criminal charges
against WorldCom and several former executives on behalf of the
8
State of Oklahoma.
The complaint accuses Bernard Ebbers,
former WorldCom Inc. chief, and other WorldCom executives of
“breaking state securities laws by giving false information to
9
investors in 2000.” Although the SEC had conducted its own
investigation into WorldCom and indicted the former chief
financial officer and other junior executives, it had not taken
10
action against Mr. Ebbers. According to Edmondson, his actions
against both WorldCom and several of its executives were justified
because the “WorldCom debacle cost the state pension fund $64
11
million.” Additionally, Edmondson asserted that WorldCom had
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Allan Chernoff, WorldCom Case Ignites Turf Battle, Aug. 27, 2003, at
http://money.cnn.com/2003/08/27/news/companies/turf_war/ (last visited
May 15, 2004).
8. Atlas, supra note 1. In November, Edmondson dropped the charges
against Mr. Ebbers “but promised to refile them once Mr. Sullivan had been
retried.” Kenneth N. Gilpin & Barnaby J. Feder, Ebbers, Ex-Chief of WorldCom, Is
Indicted on Federal Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at C5.
9. Ron Jenkins, Oklahoma Charges Ebbers, Other Former WorldCom Executives,
MISSISSIPPI SUNHERALD, Aug. 27. 2003, at http://www.sunherald.com/mld/
sunherald/news/politics/6629942.htm (last visited May 15, 2004).
10. Id. Although federal charges were not yet filed when Edmondson filed
state criminal charges against Ebbers, the federal government recently indicted
Ebbers on federal criminal charges. See Barnaby J. Feder & Kurt Eichenwald, ExWorldCom Chief Is Indicted by U.S. in Securities Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at A1.
11. Barnaby J. Feder, Ex-WorldCom Chief Pleads Not Guilty to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,
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not “purged itself of wrongdoing” by filing for bankruptcy.
Rather, according to Edmondson, WorldCom is being “rewarded
13
for its bad acts.”
In contrast, although Donaldson initially criticized New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer for failing to give the SEC notice of
his enforcement actions against mutual funds and hedge funds for
improper trading, Donaldson later stated that, unlike Edmondson,
Spitzer’s efforts resulted in “state action [which] clearly opened a
new front in our efforts to ensure all investors are treated
14
fairly . . . .” Last year, Wall Street investors were caught off guard
when Spitzer alleged that “research reports generated by Wall
15
Street analysts were tainted.” According to Spitzer, Wall Street
firms “wrote glowing reports on companies they knew were flawed”
16
in order to win investment banking business. Spitzer produced
“damning e-mails in which analysts trashed stocks they were
17
recommending to investors.” In sharp contrast to his criticism of
Edmondson’s actions, Donaldson has applauded Spitzer’s efforts
and has stated that “the SEC is working closely with Spitzer to see
18
that appropriate action is taken against all wrongdoers.”
Donaldson’s remarks remind us that state action can be both
extremely beneficial and problematic. Recognizing the importance
and value of state enforcement actions is crucial because the House
of Representatives is drafting legislation “that would limit state
19
powers to curb [abuses on] Wall Street” in order to establish the
20
preeminence of the SEC “as the national securities regulator.”

Mar. 4, 2004, at C5.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Atlas, supra note 1; see also Charles Stein, Watchdogs Zero In: Mutual Funds
Are on the Hot Seat Over Suspected Unfair Trading: While New York’s Spitzer Grabbed
Focus, Galvin Was Conducting His Own Inquiries in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 5, 2003, at D1 (explaining that Spitzer was not the only state official
investigating improper trading by mutual funds; Massachusetts Secretary of State
William F. Galvin, like Spitzer, was conducting his own investigation into what he
called, “two sets of rules, one for the average citizen and one for the insiders”).
15. Stein, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Jeanne Zurlo, SEC Chairman Announces Cooperative Effort With States, Sept.
16, 2003, at http://wallstreet.cch.com/news/headlines/page320.asp (last visited
May 15, 2004).
19. Fraud Investigations Pressure Those Backing Bill to Curb State Powers, 30
SECURITIES WEEK 36, 36 (2003).
20. Id.
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The bill “prohibits states from imposing penalties that differ from
21
the SEC, NYSE, and NASD.” Its primary sponsor is Representative
Richard Baker of Louisiana, the chairman of the House Financial
Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and
22
Government Sponsored Enterprises.
Baker argues that this
legislation is needed “to avoid costly and disruptive overlapping
23
prosecutions by state and federal regulators.” The SEC has not
officially taken a position on the legislation but many believe it
24
favors the bill.
Both state securities regulators and investor
25
advocacy lobbies, not surprisingly, have strenuously opposed it.
Although passing this legislation will be difficult because of the
recent disclosures by both New York and Massachusetts officials
that their state-backed investigations have uncovered illegal trading
in the mutual funds industry, questions remain as to the proper
26
role of the states in securities enforcement. Much has already
been written about the general relationship between federal
securities laws and state securities laws, but this article will argue
that, contrary to the trend found in both academic literature and
the proposed legislation, state enforcement of securities laws is
essential. This conclusion is drawn from public choice theory,
which, as applied to this area, suggests that multiple, independent
enforcement agencies will best protect the investing public.
Neither the Securities Act of 1933 (the “33 Act”) nor the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “34 Act”) completely
preempt state securities laws. Much contemporary literature,
however, questions the continued role of the states in light of
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Zurlo, supra note 18; see also Stein, supra note 14.
In fact, state regulators were handed a victory when the “House Financial Services
Committee struck language from an investor protection bill that would have
diluted the powers of state securities regulators when they pursued fraud cases.”
Gretchen Morgenson, State Regulators Win Some, Lose Some, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29,
2004. With this victory, however, also came a loss. “New regulations issued by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the federal overseer of banks that is
part of the Treasury, placed all authority to regulate national banks at the federal
level.” Id. As a result, “state banking laws have been pre-empted.” Id. Many,
including Eliot Spitzer, have objected to these new regulations and have cited the
fact that state banking regulators themselves have argued that consumers will be
hurt because “[t]here are local issues in banking that are best addressed by the
states.” Id.
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recent actions taken by Congress and the Self-Regulatory
Organizations (the “SROs”) to strengthen both corporate
governance regulation and securities regulation. To make a case
for dual enforcement of securities regulation, this article will
examine the following: 1) the history of the blue-sky laws; 2) the
resulting inadequacies of the state blue-sky laws; 3) the history and
justifications for enacting the 33 and 34 Acts; 4) the extent of
preemption by the 33 Act and 34 Act; and 5) the present debate
over dual enforcement.
This article concludes that public choice theory shows that the
states should be involved in the enforcement of securities
regulation. Investor confidence is essential to the protection and
integrity of the securities market. Because public choice theory is
based on the assumption that most politicians, bureaucrats, and
other decision-makers are rationally self-interested, the most
vigorous method for securities enforcement includes a system of
dual regulation. Those who oppose this type of regulatory system
might argue that this method of dual securities enforcement is
inefficient. This article, however, argues that dual regulation of the
securities market is actually extremely efficient. Dual regulation,
regulation by both the state and federal government, is an efficient
method of regulating the securities market because federalism
itself is efficient. This article will illustrate that the core values of
federalism, citizen participation in government, efficiency in
government, creative experimentation, and diffusion of power are
served by having a dual regulatory system.
II. HISTORY OF THE BLUE-SKY LAWS
Between 1911 and 1933, specialized state statutes known as
“blue-sky” laws were almost exclusively responsible for the
27
regulation of securities sales in the United States. State blue-sky
laws were a response by the state legislatures to securities fraud and
28
other serious abuses in unregulated markets. In order to combat
27. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70
TEX. L. REV. 347, 348 n.1 (1991) (noting that there was “some federal regulation of
securities sales during this period under the postal fraud laws, but the level of
enforcement was minimal”).
28. Id. at n.7 (citing VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA—A
HISTORY 162-63 (Ralph W. Hidy ed., 1970) (“Suffering heavy losses, the victims of
these [securities] frauds and misrepresentations agitated for protection, then
joined with other dissatisfied midwesterners to elect reform administrations that
promised them relief from such abuses.”); LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE
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these abuses, many states “adopted legislation requiring that
securities proposed to be sold in a state be submitted to an
administrative agency for review as to their ‘merit’ or intrinsic
29
worth.” Other states, not wanting to impose this type of “merit”
regulation, required only disclosure of information “about the
30
issuer and registration of dealers.”
This wave of blue-sky legislation was, at least in part, due to the
31
Dolley is
work of Kansas Banking Commissioner J.N. Dolley.
credited with developing blue-sky legislation and promoting it
32
throughout the nation.
In 1911, Dolley persuaded the Kansas
33
legislature to become the first state to adopt his proposal. The
Kansas law “generally required that firms selling securities in
Kansas obtain a license from the bank commissioner and file
34
regular reports of financial condition.” In addition, “[i]nvestment
companies were . . . required to file reports of their business plan
and financial condition and to file a copy of all securities they
35
proposed to sell in Kansas.” The statute also authorized the bank
commissioner
to bar an investment company from the state if he
concluded, upon examining these documents, that the
information about the investment company or security
SKY LAW 7-8 (1958) (asserting that blue-sky laws grew out of an awareness of “the
many instances in which unsophisticated . . . investors had been bilked of their life
savings by sellers of worthless or fraudulent securities”); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 44-45 (1982) (describing Kansas’s statute, the
first blue-sky law, as a response to “the failure of lax state corporation statutes to
prevent securities fraud”); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory
Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 18-33 (1983) (citing pre-1934 state bluesky laws as evidence of the fact that securities fraud was considered a serious and
widespread problem before the enactment of the federal securities acts); Murray J.
Edelman, Securities Regulation in the 48 States (July 1942) (manuscript published
by The Council of State Governments) (citing Justice McKenna’s opinion in Hall
v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U.S. 539 (1917), as a typical justification of state securities
legislation as a means of protecting the public from the “evil” of speculative and
fraudulent schemes)).
29. Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 348-49 (internal citations omitted).
30. Id. at 349 (internal citations omitted).
31. Id. at 350; see also LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 7 n.22
(1958); Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing
Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 231 (2003).
32. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 361; see also Mahoney, supra note 31,
at 231-32.
33. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 231; see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION 16 (2d ed. 1997).
34. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 361.
35. Id.
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proposed to be sold contained any “unfair, unjust,
inequitable or oppressive” provision, or that the
investment company was “not solvent and did not intend
to do a fair and honest business, and . . . did not promise
a fair return on the stocks, bonds, or other securities . . .
36
offered for sale.”
Dolley’s efforts, both in Kansas and throughout the country,
37
combined with the economic conditions of the time and pervasive
public revulsion against fraudulent securities practices, helped
38
blue-sky legislation gain national attention.
As awareness increased, however, so too did interest group
39
State blue-sky legislation was both supported and
activity.
40
opposed by defined vested interests. Interest groups supporting
the Kansas model included the owners of small banks and savings
institutions “who saw blue-sky legislation as a means for suppressing
41
competition for depositors’ funds,” state banking regulators who
were “interested in protecting and expanding their regulatory turf
and in advancing the financial interests of banks under their
42
supervision,” and farmers and small-business owners who “saw the
suppression of securities sales as a useful means for increasing their
own access to bank credit” by excluding competition from out-of43
state borrowers. The nation’s elite investment bankers were the
36. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210).
37. See id. at 350.
Economic conditions—a sustained period of inflation and high
nominal interest rates—threatened the ability of small banks and
savings institutions to attract or retain consumer deposits in
competition with higher yielding securities and restricted the supply of
credit to local borrowers. This threat gave both small banks and local
borrowers an interest in suppressing the activities of out-of-state
securities firms.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 351 (“[I]nterest group activity generally appears to be greater at
times when the interest group is suffering an economic downturn, or the threat of
a downturn, than when it is enjoying prosperity.”); see also Elisabeth Keller &
Gregory A. Gehlmann, Symposium: Current Issues in Securities Regulation: Introductory
Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 332-34 (1988).
40. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 351; see also Keller & Gehlmann,
supra note 39.
41. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 351.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 367 (stating that farmers were supporters of blue-sky laws because
they needed both mortgage financing and temporary credit between planting and
harvest seasons).
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44

group principally opposed to this type of blue-sky legislation.
Although the bankers did not object to suppressing speculative
securities, they believed blue-sky legislation would “restrict the
45
activities of reputable investment firms.” Joining the investment
banks in opposing blue-sky legislation were large issuers of
securities, who wanted to “preserve their ready access to low-cost
financing in the public securities markets,” and the nation’s bigger
banks, although they do not appear to have been lobbying as
46
actively against the legislation.
The type of regulation adopted by the states varied depending
47
on which interest groups were active in that state. For example,
the more stringent blue-sky statutes—those similar, if not identical
to, the Kansas model—were “adopted in agricultural states without
a significant presence of large banks, investment houses, or major
48
manufacturing firms.” The agricultural states following, at least in
49
50
part, the Kansas blue-sky model were Arizona, Vermont,
51
52
53
54
55
Louisiana, Arkansas, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, North
56
57
58
59
60
Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia.

44. Id. at 351.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 352, 377-78.
49. Id. at 377 n.180 (citing Act of May 18, 1912, ch. 69, 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws
338 (vesting enforcement powers in the state corporation commission)).
50. Id. n.181 (citing Act of Feb. 13, 1913, No. 170, 1912 Vt. Laws 196 (vesting
enforcement power in the state bank commissioner)).
51. Id. n.182 (citing Act of July 1, 1912, No. 40, 1912 La. Acts 47).
52. Id. n.184 (citing Arkansas Securities Act, No. 214, § 6, 1913 Ark. Acts 904,
909-11).
53. Id. n.185 (citing Idaho Securities Act, ch. 117, 1913 Idaho Sess. Laws 454,
455-56).
54. See id. at 377 n.186 (citing Act of May 2, 1913, No. 143, § 5, 1913 Mich.
Pub. Acts 243, 245-46).
55. Id. n.187 (citing Act of Mar. 13, 1913, ch. 85, § 9, 1913 Mont. Laws 367,
370-71).
56. Id. n.188 (citing Supervision of Investment Companies, ch. 109, § 5, 1913
N.D. Laws 137, 139-40).
57. Id. at 378 n.193 (citing Act of Apr. 28, 1913, § 16, 1913 Ohio Laws 743,
751-52).
58. Id. at 377 n.189 (citing Act of Mar. 14, 1913, ch. 319, § 5, 1913 S.D. Laws
522, 524).
59. Id. at 378 n.190 (citing Act of Sept. 27, 1913, ch. 31, § 5, 1913 Tenn. Pub.
Acts 500, 502-03).
60. See id. at 378 n.191 (citing Act of Feb. 6, 1913, ch. 15, § 5, 1913 W. Va. Acts
114, 117-18).
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In contrast, in states with securities houses or significant
manufacturing interests, as well as in states competing to attract
corporations to charter within their borders, Kansas-style legislation
61
was not as successful. Efforts to enact these laws failed in Nevada,
Maryland, and Delaware, three states that were active participants
62
in the market for corporate charters. In Indiana, the legislature
approved a blue-sky statute but intense lobbying by investment
bankers and manufacturers resulted in the statute being vetoed by
63
64
the governor. Blue-sky legislation in Colorado was also vetoed.
States with active securities industries and large manufacturing
firms—Illinois and Pennsylvania—rejected proposals for legislation
65
based on the Kansas model. In Minnesota, a blue-sky statute was
66
proposed but later defeated.
In still other states, some form of blue-sky legislation was
67
adopted, but lacked several key features of the Kansas model. For
example, both Missouri and Florida adopted legislation modeled in
part on the Kansas statute, but the legislation omitted “the crucial
power to reject a sale of securities if the offering did not promise a
68
fair return on the investment.” Maine, a state competing in the
market for corporate charters, adopted a disclosure regulation
“patterned generally on legislation recommended by the
69
70
71
Investment Bankers Association [“IBA”].”
Georgia, Iowa,
72
73
74
75
76
Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin
adopted legislation “requiring registration and disclosure and
prohibiting fraud, but not permitting the exclusion of securities

61. Id. at 380.
62. Id. at 378.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 378 n.204 (citing Act of April 9, 1913, ch. 209, §§ 12, 21, 1913 Me.
Laws 291, 292, 297).
70. Id. at 379 n.206 (citing Act of Aug. 19, 1913, No. 263, 1913 Ga. Laws 117).
71. Id. n.207 (citing Act of April 19, 1913, ch. 137, 1913 Iowa Laws 137).
72. See id. at 379 n.208 (citing Act of Apr. 21, 1913, ch. 199, 1913 Neb. Laws
603).
73. Id. n.209 (citing Act of Mar. 12, 1913, ch. 156, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 249).
74. Id. n.210 (citing Act of Feb. 28, 1913, ch. 341, 1913 Or. Gen. Laws 668).
75. Id. n.211 (citing Act of Aug. 21, 1913, 33d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 32, 1913 Tex.
Gen. Laws 66).
76. Id. n.212 (citing Act of Aug. 21, 1913, ch. 756, 1913 Wis. Laws 1108).
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77

solely because they were bad investments.” In Massachusetts, the
78
location of a leading securities exchange, the legislature adopted
a blue-sky statute similar to legislation proposed by the IBA, not
79
one similar to the Kansas model. Finally, in New York a battle was
waged between the interest groups favoring the Kansas model and
those opposed to it. In the end, the IBA was able to stop the
80
adoption of a Kansas-style blue-sky law.
Between 1911 and 1913, there was a flurry of legislative activity.
States were called upon to respond to abuses in the securities
market and most did so by enacting some form of blue-sky
81
82
legislation. In 1914, legislative activity abruptly came to an end.
Perhaps the most important reason was the constitutionality of
83
blue-sky legislation being attacked by the IBA.
In a series of
decisions, courts undercut blue-sky statutes for a variety of
84
reasons.
In 1915, however, the economic conditions began to
drastically improve both because interest rates lowered and war85
related orders caused exports to increase. As a result, the interest
86
groups involved began to pay less attention to blue-sky legislation.
Representatives for both sides attempted to achieve a compromise
by writing a new model blue-sky law that would be accepted by
87
everyone. But the compromise failed, resulting in heightened
tensions once again between those supporting, and those opposing,
88
blue-sky legislation.
Many of the lower court decisions striking down state blue-sky
77. Id. at 379.
78. See id. (noting that the Boston Stock Exchange was the primary market for
industrial securities before 1900).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 48-80 and accompanying text.
82. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 380.
83. Id. at 381.
84. See, e.g., Ala. & New Orleans Transp. Co. v. Doyle, 210 F. 173 (E.D. Mich.
1914) (stating that Michigan’s blue-sky statutes went far beyond their stated
purpose of prohibiting fraudulent practices; the statute exceeded the state’s police
powers); William R. Compton Co. v. Allen, 216 F. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (per
curiam) (stating that blue-sky legislation infringed on the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship) cert. dismissed, 239 U.S. 652 (1915); Bracey v.
Darst, 218 F. 482 (N.D.W. Va. 1914) (holding that the blue-sky legislation violated
the privileges and immunities clause, violated due process and burdened interstate
commerce).
85. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 383.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 384-85.
88. Id. at 386.
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laws were appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The
Court “flatly repudiated all the lower court opinions in the IBA’s
favor and . . . ruled against the IBA point-by-point on the
90
constitutional issues.”
Interestingly, while the IBA lost the
91
individual battles, it largely won the war. The Court made clear
that the blue-sky statutes could pass constitutional muster only if
they did not regulate interstate commerce but instead regulated
92
the disposition of securities within a state.
This language
confirmed what the IBA and others had believed for the past few
years—that blue-sky legislation could be circumvented by “mail
93
solicitations” or “other modalities of interstate commerce.” Thus,
although the Court’s decisions appeared to validate blue-sky
legislation, they instead “proved to be a charter for the business of
94
unregulated interstate securities sales by mail . . . .”
III. RESULTING INADEQUACY OF STATE BLUE-SKY LAWS
Blue-sky legislation appeared, at least initially, to effectively
combat securities fraud and other abuses of the market. It was
soon apparent, however, that state legislation by itself was
95
inadequate.
The “increasingly interstate nature of modern
business,” the “reluctance of many, if not most, state legislatures to
provide for effective enforcement of . . . Blue-sky laws,” and the
illusory nature of many of the blue-sky laws are the three reasons
96
advanced to account for the inadequacy of state regulation.
As a result of the earlier discussed Supreme Court opinions,
blue-sky laws could easily be evaded by disposing of securities out of
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 39, at 332.
In Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 587 (1917), Justice McKenna
conceded that the statute burdened honest business, but only to the extent that
“dishonest business may not be done.” Additionally, Justice McKenna made clear
that the blue-sky legislation in question applied only to the disposition of securities
within the state, thus “incidentally” affecting interstate commerce. Id. at 587-89.
In Geiger-Jones Co. v. Turner, 230 F. 233 (S.D. Ohio 1916), rev’d, 242 U.S. 539, 559
(1917), the blue-sky legislation was once again upheld because, as Justice
McKenna pointed out, the legislation governed only the sale or disposition of
securities within a state’s borders.
91. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 388.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 389.
95. 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 1-B-6, at 146 (3d
ed. 1991).
96. 1 Id. at 146-47, 150.
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state. In addition to the problems caused by the increasingly
interstate nature of the economy, “parsimonious state budgets
97
meant [an] understaffing of state securities law programs.” It is
hard to imagine how states with undersized programs could be
expected to control “corporate entities that are sometimes bigger
98
in terms of assets than the states themselves.” Additionally, the
stock market crash of 1929 resulted in a crisis of investor
99
confidence and a widespread panic ensued. Finally, by the 1930s,
it was apparent that many of the blue-sky laws were fraught with so
100
many exemptions that they were essentially an illusory protection.
As a result, Congress had no choice but to draft legislation
involving the federal government in the regulation of securities.
IV. FEDERAL 33 AND 34 ACTS: THE 33 AND 34 ACTS
Having finally reached the point of legislating, “Congress was
101
Before drafting
faced with a choice of conflicting philosophies.”
legislation defining the federal government’s role in securities
regulation, Congress had to choose one of three philosophies as its
102
model. Some wanted a fraud act similar to New York’s Martin Act
97. 1 Id. at 147-49.
98. 1 Id. at 150.
99. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 2-5 (1982).
100. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-B, at 150.
101. 1 Id. § 1-G, at 169.
102. New York’s Martin Act grants broad investigatory power to the Attorney
General:
Whenever it appears to the attorney general that, in connection with
any security (or commodity) or investment advice, any person shall
have employed, or employs, or is about to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of
any false pretense, representation or promise . . . or he believes it to be
in the public interest that an investigation be made, he may in his
discretion either require or permit such person . . . to file with him a
statement in writing under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and
circumstances concerning the subject matter which he believes it is to
the public interest to investigate . . . . The attorney-general may also
require such other data and information as he may deem relevant and
may make such special and independent investigations as he may deem
necessary in connection with the matter.
1 Id. § 1-B, at 76 (quoting the Martin Act currently codified at N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §
352 et seq. (McKinney 1996)). The Martin Act centralizes all enforcement,
including criminal prosecutions, with the Attorney General. Id. at 78-79.
Additionally, the words “fraud and fraudulent practice are given ‘a wide
meaning’ ” in New York. Id. at 81 (quoting People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154
N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926)). “[A]ll acts, although not originating in any actual evil
design or contrivance to perpetuate fraud or injury upon others, which do by their
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103

or, better yet, stern enforcement of the penal laws. They argued
that preventive laws would not work and would hinder honest
104
businesses.
Others wanted to have a law similar to the Kansas
105
This
blue-sky law—that is, a law based on “merit standards.”
group would have liked the new federal act to provide for
“revocation of registration upon an administrative finding (among
other standards) that the enterprise or business of the issuer . . . or
the security is not based upon sound principles, and that the
revocation is in the interest of the public welfare,” or that the issuer
“is in any other way dishonest” or “in unsound condition or
106
insolvent.”
The intermediate position sought a disclosure law more or less
107
like the English Companies Act, which rejected the idea of a
regulatory policy by stating that “[i]t would be an attempt to throw
what ought to be the responsibility of the individual on the
shoulders of the State, and would give a fictitious and unreal sense
108
of security to the investor, and might also lead to grave abuses.”
A strong proponent of this option as the preferred model for
federal legislation was then Supreme Court Justice Louis D.
109
Brandeis. According to Brandeis, “the law should not try to keep
110
investors from making bad bargains . . . .” He cited the Pure Food
Law as an example of what the law should strive for—the law
should “help the consumer to judge quality by requiring the
111
disclosure of ingredients.”
Ultimately, it was this latter philosophy that won out and was
112
effectively the philosophy of the 33 Act, which became effective
113
in May of 1933.
In substance, it provided “for the filing of a
registration statement and the use of a prospectus in connection

tendency to deceive or mislead the purchasing public come within the purpose of
the [Martin Act].” Federated Radio, 154 N.E. at 657.
103. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-G, at 169.
104. 1 Id.
105. 1 Id. at 169-70.
106. 1 Id. at 170 (quoting S. 875 & H.R. 4313, 73d Cong., §6(c), (e), (f)
(1933)).
107. 1 Id.
108. See 1 id. at 171 (quoting The Lord Davey Committee, Cmd. 7779, § 42
(1895)).
109. 1 Id.
110. 1 Id.
111. 1 Id. at 172.
112. 1 Id.
113. 1 Id.
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with the public offering of securities, and subjected the issuer and
those connected with the offering to civil and criminal liabilities in
114
the event of material misstatements or omissions.”
Importantly,
the 33 Act is essentially a combination of both the Companies Act
115
The Act was
and the Martin Act, with some modifications.
116
appropriately termed the “truth-in-securities act”
because
Congress required only the disclosure of information that, if not
117
revealed, could harm and fool the investing public. In 1934, the
Securities Exchange Act was enacted because of the complexities of
the 33 Act and “the need for an independent administrative body
to enforce the federal securities laws, regulate stock market
118
practices, and curb the evils in the stock exchanges themselves.”
Although the enactment of the 33 and 34 Acts may have helped
solve the problem of inadequate state blue-sky legislation, it also
119
“introduced the new problem of federal-state coordination.”
V. PREEMPTION: STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES
The 33 and 34 Acts were to act as supplemental regulation to
the state blue-sky laws because it became obvious that state
legislation could not, by itself, effectively regulate the securities
market. As a result, when the 33 and 34 Acts were initially passed,
120
Congress did not preempt state law.
In fact, Congress wrote
“savings clauses” into both acts, evidenced by former section 18 of
114. 1 Id.
115. 1 Id. at 177.
116. 1 Id.
117. 1 Id.
118. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 39, at 347.
119. 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-B-2, at 44.
120. Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities
Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 500 (2003).
Although this article does not make any attempt to fully analyze preemption
doctrine and all of its complexities, a brief foray into preemption doctrine
generally is required. As noted by Professor Karmel, “[p]reemption may be
express, implied, or by reason of conflict.” Id. at 499. Preemption is express when
the statute explicitly mandates that state law is displaced. Id. Preemption is
implied, and therefore displaces state law, “if federal law so thoroughly occupies a
legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the states to supplement it.” Id. at 500 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). Often, this type of preemption is referred to as field
preemption. Id. Finally, conflict preemption may result in the displacement of
state law if “either it is impossible to comply with both a state and a federal law, or
if the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
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122

the 33 Act, and former section 28 of the 34 Act.
According to
available legislative history, the initial 1933 Act bill, which made it
through the House, “set forth a clause prohibiting the sale of
securities in interstate commerce into any state if such sale would
123
have violated the blue-sky laws of that state.”
The apparent
purpose of this clause was “to assure the states that the [Securities
Act] was not an attempt to supplant their laws, but an attempt to
supplement their laws and to assist them in enforcing their laws in
124
those cases where they have no control.”
Although this clause
125
was later deleted by a Senate amendment, the “savings clauses”
clearly illustrate that Congress’ intent in enacting the Securities Act
126
was not to preempt state blue-sky laws generally.
Even though there was no field preemption of the state bluesky legislation by the 33 and 34 Acts, in 1947 the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association concluded that the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
“should be requested to consider ‘a new uniform or model State
Sale of Securities Act’ in cooperation with the ABA ‘to the end that
the existing diversity of legal requirements preliminary to the
issuance of securities be minimized to the greatest possible
127
extent.’”
Drafting this legislation was an extremely difficult task
128
In 1956,
because each state had its own regulatory philosophy.
nine years later, the Uniform Securities Act was finally promulgated
129
130
and approved by the ABA. It is primarily a regulatory law with a
121. Id. at 500-01 (“Nothing in this Subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of
the securities commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of
any State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any
security or any person.”).
122. Id. at 501 (“[N]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.”).
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Federal Securities Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. 117 (1933) (statement of Ollie M.
Butler, Foreign Service Div., Dept. of Commerce)).
125. Karmel, supra note 120, at 501 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 10-11, 25
(1933)). Although the reasons behind the Senate’s actions are not clear, it may
have deleted the clause in an effort to maximize commerce, guarding against the
possibility that the state laws proved to be too restrictive.
126. Id.
127. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-B-2, at 46 (quoting 72 ABA Rep.
98, 297 (1947)).
128. 1 Id. at 47.
129. 1 Id. This Uniform Securities Act was also approved in principle by the
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four-part structure whose “first three parts [are] designed to stand
131
Although there were later
alone or in any combination.”
attempts to write Revised Uniform 33 and 34 Acts, these discussions
132
failed.
Currently, more than 30 jurisdictions have all, or
133
substantially all, of the 1956 Act in effect.
This dual system of securities regulation continued for some
time without any major changes. In 1994, the political balance in
Congress shifted and Congress “began a broad reexamination of
134
the current dual system of securities regulation.”
During its
deliberations over new legislation, Congress heard testimony that
“duplicative regulation tends to raise the cost of capital to
American issuers of securities without providing commensurate
135
protection to investors or to . . . [the] markets.”
Congress also
heard testimony that technological advances required changes to
136
facilitate the information flow to the investing public.
The
culmination of Congress’ deliberations was the enactment of the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 [the
137
“NSMIA”].
Congress explained its decision to enact NSMIA as
follows: “The system of dual federal and state securities regulation
has resulted in a degree of duplicative and unnecessary regulation.
Securities offerings and brokers and dealers engaged in securities
transactions are all currently subject to a dual system of regulation
138
that, in many instances, is redundant, costly, and ineffective.”
The NSMIA constituted a partial preemption of state law in

NASAA and endorsed by the SEC. 1 Id.
130. 1 Id.
131. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, at 51. Part I of the Uniform
Securities Act is entitled, “Fraudulent and Other Prohibited Practices.” 1 Id. It is
based on Rule 10b-5 and “outlaws fraudulent practices in connection with the sale
or purchase of a security,” as well as “other undesirable investment advisory
activities.” 1 Id. at 52. Part II is entitled “Registration of Broker-Dealers, Agents,
and Investment Advisors,” and deals with registration procedures and postregistration requirements. 1 Id. Part III of the Uniform Securities Act is entitled
“Registration of Securities,” and it describes the registration procedures that must
be adhered to before any security, unless the security or transaction is exempted,
is offered or sold in the state. 1 Id. at 53. Finally, Part IV is a general provision
that details how the first three parts are to be implemented. 1 Id.
132. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, § 1-B-4, at 52.
133. 1 Id. at 50.
134. 1 Id. at 60.
135. 1 Id. at 61.
136. 1 Id.
137. 1 Id. at 60.
138. 1 Id. at 61.
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139

the securities offering and shareholder report areas. The NSMIA
did not, however, completely preempt state blue-sky laws. Section
18(c)(1) of the Act preserves state authority “to investigate and
bring enforcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or
unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with the
140
securities or securities transactions.” The NSMIA preempts the
authority of state securities regulators to regulate the securities
registration and offering process by imposing requirements on the
141
contents of prospectuses or other offering documents.
Essentially, the NSMIA “preempts aspects of securities registration
and reporting processes for specified covered securities” but does
not “diminish state authority to investigate and bring enforcement
142
actions generally with respect to securities transactions.”
The NSMIA expressly preserved state authority to bring
enforcement actions with respect to securities transactions.
Consequently, three distinct types of blue-sky laws remained in
effect after 1996: antifraud provisions, provisions requiring the
registration or licensing of certain persons engaged in the
securities business, and provisions requiring the registration of
143
securities. This article is concerned with a state’s involvement in
the enforcement of its antifraud provisions. These provisions
“operate by means of investigation, injunction, and prosecution
independently of any registration system, and typically there are no
144
exemptions from their coverage.”
A state’s antifraud provisions
are “intended to enable the administrator to issue public warnings,
to investigate suspected fraudulent activities, to take injunctive or
145
other steps to stop them, and as a last resort, to punish them.”
Some forty-three jurisdictions have antifraud provisions. Many
of these jurisdictions have adopted the basic fraud provision found
146
in the Uniform Securities Act of 1956.
Still other jurisdictions
have added provisions proscribing more specific manipulative
147
The remaining jurisdictions have adopted their own
practices.
fraud provisions, not modeled after the Uniform Securities Act but
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

1 Id. at 62.
1 Id. at 63.
1 Id. at 61-62.
1 Id. at 63-64.
1 Id. at 67.
1 Id.
1 Id.
1 Id. at 69.
1 Id.
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148

nevertheless addressing the same abuses of the market.
Although the states’ antifraud provisions have not been
149
preempted by federal legislation, the debate continues as to
whether states should have a role in the enforcement of securities
laws given the recent legislation by Congress and the new
requirements of the SROs. This article will argue that public
choice theory supports the involvement of the states in the
enforcement of securities laws.
VI. SHOULD THERE BE DUAL ENFORCEMENT
OF THE SECURITIES LAWS?
When the 33 and 34 Acts were enacted, they were supposed to
act as an additional method of securities law enforcement because
it was obvious that the states could not adequately police
nationwide securities markets. Regardless of the stated purpose of
the 33 and 34 Acts, it became increasingly harder to draw a line
between the coverage of state and federal securities laws.
Concededly, purely duplicative regulation is in nobody’s best
interests. Something had to be done to ensure that what had the
potential to be a comprehensive system of dual securities
enforcement did not become redundant and ineffective.
A. The Initial Distinction Between State and Federal Securities Law
and Its Subsequent Erosion
Between 1977 and 1987, the Supreme Court “addressed
securities law federalism issues in the context of drawing a line

148. See 1 id.
149. Although not mentioned in the text of this article, the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 [the “SLUSA”] did preempt “covered”
securities fraud class actions under the common law and statutes of all fifty states.
See Karmel, supra note 120, at 511-13. The SLUSA was adopted as “a reaction
against attempts to evade the obstacles to federal securities class actions erected by
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 by using state court class
actions.” Id. at 511-13. Although SLUSA did provide that securities fraud class
action suits covered by the statute could not be brought in state court, “state law
continues to provide remedies for plaintiffs suing in an individual capacity and in
class actions brought by state and local governmental entities and their pension
funds.” Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1998).
This article’s focus is on the states’ ability to bring enforcement actions for
violations of securities laws. As a result, this article makes no attempt to cover the
intricacies of either SLUSA or the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
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between state corporate law concerning the fiduciary duties of
managers and directors and federal securities law obligations
150
placed on public companies and their officers and directors.”
It
seemed, at least from a political standpoint, that the Court was
concerned with “restricting the coverage of the federal securities
151
laws, especially in the corporate governance area.”
152
In Cort v. Ash, the Court attempted to articulate a distinction
between state corporate law and federal securities law:
“Corporations are creatures of state laws and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stock holders, state law will govern the
153
internal affairs of the corporation.” Soon after deciding Cort, the
Court applied its newly articulated distinction in another case
arising under the federal securities laws, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
154
Green.
The plaintiffs in Santa Fe wanted the Court to apply Rule
10(b)(5) of the 1934 Act to a breach of corporate fiduciary
155
duties.
The Court, however, declined to apply federal securities
law to the plaintiff’s claims of “internal corporate
156
Instead, the Court noted that “[a]bsent a
mismanagement.”
clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to
federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that
deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established
157
state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.” The
158
Court went further in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
indicating that Santa Fe “would not be confined to its facts, but
159
rather was a general holding concerning federalism.”
Despite these initial decisions attempting to fine-tune the
distinction between state securities law and federal securities law,
150. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 503.
151. Id.
152. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
153. Id. at 84.
154. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
155. Id. at 474 n.14.
156. Id. at 479.
157. Id.
158. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
159. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 504. Schreiber raised the issue of “whether
the withdrawal of a hostile tender offer bid and the substitution of a partial bid,
following negotiations with the target company’s management, constituted a
manipulative act under the Williams Act, an amendment to the Exchange Act
which regulates tender offers.” Id.
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the distinction articulated in cases such as Cort has slowly eroded; in
fact, after recent actions by Congress and the SROs, the distinction
has since become virtually non-existent. Through the years, the
role of the federal government in securities regulation has become
less of a supporting role and more of a lead role and new
legislation has taken central aspects of corporate governance law
160
away from the states.
The newly enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [the “SOX
Act”] does “not even pretend to stay on the disclosure and trading
side of the rhetorically federal-state division of power, not even
offering perfunctory respect for state rules governing the
161
corporation’s internal affairs.”
The SOX Act “mandates that the
SEC require attorneys representing securities issuers to report
evidence of material securities laws violations up the corporate
162
chain of command, ultimately to the CEO.”
The SOX Act
further requires that should the CEO not respond appropriately by
“adopting . . . remedial measures or sanctions,” then the lawyer
must seek out the board’s independent directors, audit committee,
163
or the board as a whole. Provisions such as these require that an
attorney be a gatekeeper not just for securities law violations, but
164
for any “breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation.” This is just
one example of how the SOX Act has taken what was perceived to
be a matter subject to state control—corporate control of fiduciary
165
duties—and turned it into a matter controlled by federal law.
Additionally, SROs such as the New York Stock Exchange have
proposed new listing requirements in 2002 that “intrude more into
traditional state governance than ever before and . . . appear to be
occurring as part of an interaction with federal regulators so that
th[ey] may be part of an indirect federalization of corporate
160. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 621 (2003)
(discussing such burgeoning federal incursions into state law as “regulating goingprivate transactions, instituting an all-holders rule, barring dual-class
recapitalizations, . . . mandating how shareholders with almost half of the
country’s shares treat their votes,” and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); see also
Robert Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law
and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 967 (2003) (discussing the idea
that federal law “no longer fits into the supporting role category”).
161. Roe, supra note 160, at 633.
162. Id. at 623.
163. Id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116
Stat. 745, 784 (2002)).
164. Id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley § 307).
165. Id.
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166

law.”
The NYSE proposed listing requirements “require a
majority of independent directors, and three important board
167
committees made up of only independent directors.”
The
proposed listing requirements also would “change the role of
shareholders in terms of requiring their approval of compensation
168
plans beyond that required by state law.”
These new listing
requirements illustrate that just as the SOX Act has encroached
upon areas traditionally left to state control, so too have the SROs.
The question that remains is what role, if any, is left for the states in
the securities regulation and enforcement arena.
B. The Debate Surrounding Dual Regulation vs. National Federal
Regulation
Although this article will argue that public choice theory
supports the idea that states should maintain some role in the
enforcement of securities laws, there have been other arguments
raised on both sides of this debate that need mentioning. Those
against the states having a role in securities regulation often argue
that blue-sky laws are too complex—they are a “crazy-quilt of state
regulations no longer significant or meaningful in purpose, and
169
usually stultifying in effect, or just plain useless.”
Commentators
have also noted that piecemeal state enforcement may prove
burdensome in that it costs too much and can lead to conflicting
170
results, as opposed to increased investor protection.
A recent
example of state enforcement that fueled the arguments of those
opposed to state action was Oklahoma Attorney General Drew
Edmondson’s decision to bring criminal charges against former
171
WorldCom chief Bernard Ebbers and several other executives.
Edmondson’s actions are a response to what he perceives as
166. See Thompson, supra note 160, at 963 (noting the proposed changes to
NYSE listing requirements can be found at www.nyse.com/pdfs/xlnv9n06.pdf).
Other SROs, such as NASDAQ, have proposed revisions to current listing
requirements, which can be found at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Seb_Corp_
Gov&uscore;SummaryFeb-revised.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004). Id.
167. Id. at 965.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., J. Sinclair Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REV. 713, 714-15
(1958).
170. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 546; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Striking the
Right Balance: Federal and State Regulation of Financial Institutions: Securities
Regulation: Blue Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53
BROOK. L. REV. 105 (1987).
171. Ex-WorldCom Chief Ebbers Is Charged, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at C8.
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insufficient punishment of WorldCom by the SEC and the
172
Concededly, bringing state enforcement
bankruptcy process.
action just because one is unhappy with the results of an intense
investigation led by the SEC is not an example of the good that
state enforcement action can bring. Such action, brought without
any new or independent evidence, is the type of duplicative state
action that is costly and, for the most part, largely ineffective in
preventing future abuses or setting new precedents.
The other side of the argument, however, is that aggressive
state action can highlight gaps and problems in the federal
regulatory scheme, as evidenced by the actions of New York
173
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. Spitzer’s investigation uncovered
an illegal trading scheme, opening the eyes of both the SEC and
the investing public. As a result of the investigation led by New
York, California, and New Jersey,
Merrill Lynch [has] agreed, among other things: to sever
the link between compensation for analysts and that for
investment banking; prohibit investment banking input
into analysts’ compensation; to create a new investment
review committee responsible for approving all research
recommendations; to disclose in its research reports
whether it has received or is entitled to receive any
compensation from a covered company over the past 12
174
months; and to pay a $100 million fine.
Seeing such zealous law enforcement is arguably a boost for
investor confidence. The actions of Spitzer have been cited as a
prime example of the states stepping in to “fill the void left by weak
175
federal regulation.”
Additionally, commentators have posited that eliminating the
states’ involvement in enforcing securities regulation will result in
176
only selective enforcement by the federal government.
Responding to arguments that blue-sky laws are just too complex,
one author has acknowledged that each state has varying blue-sky
172. Id.
173. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 546.
174. Id. at 520; see also Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. Dep’t of Law, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement
to Reform Investment Practices (May 21, 2002), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press
2002/may/may21a02.html (last visited May 15, 2004).
175. Karmel, supra note 120, at 522 (citing Susanne Craig, Local Enforcers Gain
Clout on Street, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2002, at C1); see also New Cops on the Beat,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 2002, at 77, 78.
176. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 160, at 634.
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laws but notes that “there are a number of uniformity initiatives”
177
that have been put before the states for approval. Moreover, the
lack of uniformity among the state blue-sky laws is less of an issue
178
today now that the states are limited to antifraud enforcement.
Finally, two practical arguments weigh in favor of leaving the
dual enforcement scheme in place. First, it is unrealistic to believe
that the federal government can effectively oversee the securities
markets and prevent securities abuses in all fifty states. The SEC
neglected to notice an improper trading scheme to the tune of
almost a billion dollars taking place right under its nose in the
biggest securities market in the United States. This raises serious
questions as to its ability to detect other, perhaps smaller, abuses
taking place in other markets. Additionally, even if there were one
national federal standard, this standard might not be interpreted
uniformly throughout the separate federal jurisdictions. As it
stands, federal courts do not interpret the same federal laws in a
179
uniform manner.
In fact, it is quite possible for each circuit to
interpret a federal law in a different manner, thus creating twelve
differing interpretations of one federal law. The potential for
confusion clearly exists even with one national federal standard.

177. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95, at 146.
178. 1 Id.
179. For example, federal courts have taken differing approaches to the
question of whether a secondary actor may be held liable as a primary violator
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Some courts have held that
a secondary actor may not be held liable as a primary violator under § 10(b) unless
he or she makes material misstatements or omissions. See, e.g., In re Kendall
Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding
that an accountant’s “review and approval” of financial statements and
prospectuses is insufficient for primary actor liability); Vosgerichian v.
Commodore Int’l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that
allegations that an accountant “advised” and “guided” a client in making allegedly
fraudulent misrepresentations is insufficient for primary actor liability). Other
courts have held that secondary actors may be held liable as primary actors for
statements made by others in which the defendant had significant participation.
See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994)
(stating that an accountant may be held liable as a primary actor based on his
“significant role in drafting and editing” a letter sent by the issuer to the SEC); In
re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that an
accounting firm that was “intricately involved” in the creation of false and
misleading documents may be held liable as a primary actor under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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VII. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
A. Dual Enforcement of the Market Is Necessary
The 33 and 34 Acts, as well as state blue-sky laws, were enacted
to protect the people and institutions investing in the market, and
the integrity of the securities market as a whole. Public confidence
in investor protection is essential to the functioning and integrity of
180
the securities market. Today, a crisis in investor confidence exists
due to both the corporate financial scandals of Enron Corp.,
WorldCom, and other companies, as well as the market decline of
181
technology stocks.
The problem, of course, is how to achieve
public confidence. Public choice theory provides reason to be
skeptical about the success of this endeavor because it is based on
the assumption that “politicians, bureaucrats, and other decisionmakers in public life are rationally self-interested,” thereby
“maximiz[ing] their personal power and wealth even when these
182
selfish ends conflict with public-spirited goals.”
Public choice
theory, therefore, suggests that the mechanisms to obtain vigorous
market enforcement in order to maintain investor confidence must
be designed with this limitation in mind.
Public choice theory, in its simplest terms, refers to the belief
that “well-organized groups, seeking to advance their members’
self-interest at someone else’s cost, tend to win out in the public
183
policy market.”
Public choice theory “understands legislative
180. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783, 834 (2001) (discussing early empirical
research noting the correlation between investor protection and the strength of a
country’s securities markets); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate
Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (1999).
181. See Karmel, supra note 120, at 545.
182. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, The Decline of the Nation State
& Its Effect on Constitutional and International Economic Law: Contribution: A Public
Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 929 (1996) (noting that “the assumption of self-interest
means that law is traded for political support, money, power, and other things that
politicians and bureaucrats demand”).
183. Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New
Theories of the Regulatory State: Foreword: Post-Public Choice?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267,
268 (2002); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (1990); Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice
and Limits on Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 280 (1990); Paul B. Stephan III,
Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Barbarians Inside the Gate:
Public Choice Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 745
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outcomes to result from the supply and demand for political
184
outcomes.” The interests of competing groups “may be affected,
185
positively or negatively, by actions of the government.”
Presumably, individuals are willing to pay a price for government
outcomes that will benefit them. “[O]ther individuals, with
186
conflicting interests, are willing to pay for opposite results.”
A
central assumption of this theory is that legislators are prepared to
give the highest effective bidder the legislative results that it
187
desires.
Additionally, there necessarily will be interest groups
seeking government inaction just as vigorously as opposing interest
188
groups are seeking government action.
“The success of a group in outbidding competing interest
groups and achieving legislative success depends largely on the
total level of aggregated demand in the group for a particular
legislative result and on the ability of the group to manifest that
189
demand in an effective bribe to the legislator.” Whether a group
submits an effective “bribe” is determined “by the costs the group
190
encounters in achieving collective ends.”
The costs will vary
depending on the size of the interest group:
The smaller the group, the more likely it is that an
individual group member will prefer to bear the cost of
the action rather than risk its not occurring . . . . The
larger the group, the less likely it is that the individual will
be willing to pay for the group’s consumption, and the
greater is the individual’s incentive to try to pass the cost
to other group members. Larger groups will therefore
encounter more difficulty organizing and securing the
desired good . . . for its members . . . . Larger groups,
particularly those as large as the “general public,” . . . may
be entirely unable to make effective bribe offers to
191
legislators.
Thus, the victim under a public choice theory model is not likely to
be the minority. Instead, the victim appears to be the “majority
(1995); Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 921 (1998).
184. See Kahn, supra note 183, at 288.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 288-89.
188. Id. at 289.
189. Id. at 290.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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who [has] been legislatively robbed by a well-organized minority.”
The interest groups lobbying for regulation that benefits their
interests, often to the detriment of others, generally prefer federal
regulation to state regulation, especially when dealing with
193
interjurisdictional issues such as securities market regulation. For
starters, it is generally “cheaper to obtain passage of one federal bill
194
rather than fifty separate ones.”
Moreover, even if interest
groups succeed in getting a regulatory bill passed at the state level,
they must still appeal to the federal level to prevent federal law
195
from preempting the bill. Finally, “federal law is more difficult to
196
Those trying to avoid state law may
avoid than is state law.”
escape the effects of that law by relocating, but one cannot so easily
197
avoid federal law.
As a result, the federal government and its
agencies may be subject to more pressure from these various
interest groups than are state governments and agencies when it
comes to securities regulation and enforcement areas.
Therefore, because of the potential for defects and abuses in
the federal market for securities regulation, secondary avenues of
enforcement must exist.
If securities regulations are not
adequately enforced, investor confidence will suffer, as will the
market as a whole. In order for the investing public to be
confident that their interests are being protected in an
environment dominated by interest groups, the states must be
198
allowed to function as a secondary avenue of enforcement.
192. See Hovenkamp, supra note 183, at 87.
193. See Ulen, supra note 183, at 940.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Arguably, the only feasible options for the enforcement of securities laws
are to have total federal preemption or have some form of dual enforcement. It is
the position of this article that dual enforcement can be a benefit and is a
necessary consequence of public choice theory. Some commentators, however,
have made the argument that perhaps SROs are better suited than the
government to regulate corporate governance. See Thompson, supra note 160; see
also, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements,
54 SMU L. REV. 325, 327 (2001); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83
VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997); A.C. Pritchard, Market as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999);
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
Although this article does not attempt to evaluate the potential strength of such an
argument, there is one obvious flaw with this argument that works in favor of the
position advanced by this article—not every company that trades securities is
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The events of the past few months have shown us that the
investing public cannot rely solely on the federal government for
protection. For example, current and former officials of the SEC
said that the current mutual fund scandal is a result of the SEC
199
being held “captive to the [mutual fund] industry.”
A former
official in the Clinton administration stated that,
There have been decades of looking the other way . . . .
At its core, the scandals reflect the fact that mutual fund
governance is broken and Washington has stood by and
allowed it to remain broken, for a long time, without any
real effort to reform the system to the benefit of
200
investors.
Current SEC officials have stated that “none of the more than a
dozen cases that have now been brought resulted from routine
201
inspections by the commission.”
In fact, before state regulators
exposed the recent mutual fund scandals, the SEC’s examination
202
unit was not even assigned to look for these kinds of abuses.
Furthermore, critics of the SEC and former officials claim that
the Investment Company Institute (the “ICI”), the mutual fund
industry’s trade organization, exerted enormous influence over
both the SEC and Congress, resulting in lax enforcement policies
203
A recent example of the mutual fund
for mutual funds.
industry’s clout is evidenced by certain provisions in the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 that were enacted at the insistence of the ICI.
“[T]he drafters granted the mutual fund industry significant
exemptions from some of the more important provisions” of the
Act, including conflict-of-interest rules, disclosure rules, and
204
internal monitoring controls.
Additionally, Lynn E. Turner, a
former chief accountant at the SEC, said it was routine for SEC
subject to the listing requirements of the national exchanges. Therefore, the
potential would still exist for small-scale securities fraud. Arguably, the federal
government would not find such scams worthy of its involvement even if securities
regulation were not totally up to the SROs, but such fraud would still be subject to
state securities laws if the dual enforcement scheme were left in place.
199. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.’s Oversight of Mutual Funds Is Said to Be Lax, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at B2.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Shirking at the SEC:
The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 361 (1985)
(noting that the SEC is captured by special interests and therefore protects
entrenched institutions rather than the investing public).
204. Labaton, supra note 199, at B2.
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officials to consider the views of the ICI and that it was rare for the
205
SEC to adopt a regulation that went against ICI’s interests.
The size of the SEC staff charged with overseeing the mutual
fund industry is also problematic. For the past decade the Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations has been both
206
neglected and understaffed.
Until earlier this year the staff had
“a total of 350 examiners and support staff to monitor an industry
207
Although the
of 13,000 mutual funds and investment advisors.”
mutual fund industry has grown significantly through the years,
inspectors did not significantly increase the rate or depth of
208
inspections.
Inspections went from once every five years to once
209
every two for the largest firms. Thus, had the state regulators not
begun their own investigations into the mutual fund industry,
improper trading might have continued indefinitely.
Another reason for state enforcement is that federal
government enforcement is selective. There have been many
210
Some
instances of federal intervention in corporate lawmaking.
of the more notable instances are: 1) “issues of antitrust and
corporate reorganization”; 2) “1930s issues of shareholder voting
and insider trading”; 3) SEC’s 1950s proxy rules that impeded
proxy fights the states had allowed; 4) the 1960s Williams Act that
softened the tough takeover bidder tactics that the states had been
permitting; 5) “1970s issues of going private”; 6) “1970s issues of
fiduciary duties”; 7) “1980s issues of power in takeovers”; and 8)
“early twenty-first century issues of scandals and effective internal
211
governance.”
In each case, “one could argue that ouster . . . was
‘special’—so important to the national economy that the ‘normal
science’ of state corporate law-making did not apply. But that is
exactly the point: when the issue is important, federal players oust
205. Id.
206. Id. Some might argue that even if the SEC had a substantial increase in
resources, it would continue to inadequately investigate every incident involving
fraud or abuse, thus calling into question its stated goals of investor protection.
See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 969 (1994) (citing
Securities Fraud Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing & Urban Affairs, 183d Cong. 5 (June 17, 1993) (statement of William R.
McLucas)).
207. Labaton, supra note 199, at B2.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Roe, supra note 160, at 634.
211. Id.
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212

the states, or threaten to.” Unfortunately, by the time the federal
213
government does become involved, it is often too late.
This is evidenced once again by the recent mutual fund
scandal. Arguably, the SEC and the states both had the ability to
enforce the improper trading and fees charged by mutual funds—
the states, however, uncovered the improper trading and feecharging schemes and brought them to the attention of the SEC.
The SEC, despite its assertions that it should be the primary
regulator of the securities market, was caught totally unaware that
this scandal was taking place. Only after the scandal became frontpage news and threatened to undermine the authority of the SEC
did the SEC “[lay] firm claim to mutual fund turf” and voice
disapproval at the possibility “that state regulators . . . might try to
214
set new rules.”
Once again, the federal government decided to
take action, but only after the scandal publicly called into question
the ability of the SEC to effectively enforce the securities market.
Arguably, the SEC had a chance to strengthen its policies regarding
mutual funds when it passed Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002. However, the
influence of the ITI on the SEC appears to have hampered any
215
such attempt.
In light of the foregoing arguments, dual regulation of the
securities market appears to be the most effective method of both
maintaining investor confidence and ensuring the continued
viability of the securities market. Additionally, dual regulation of
the securities market is an efficient method of securities regulation.
B. Dual Enforcement, Better Known As Federalism, Is Not Inefficient
Contrary to what some might argue, dual regulation of the
securities market is not inefficient. Having both state and federal
securities enforcement is efficient because federalism itself is
efficient. The core values of federalism, “citizen participation in
government, efficiency in government, creative experimentation,
216
and diffusion of power” are served by a dual regulatory system.

212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Floyd Norris, Is the Mutual Fund Issue Abuses, or Is It Fees?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2003, at B4.
215. Labaton, supra note 199, at B2.
216. See Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to
Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227, 230-31 (1987).
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1. Competition
In a market-driven economy, competition is usually seen as the
engine that drives efficient outcomes; conversely, monopoly is
viewed as inefficient, both because of the allocative inefficiencies
inherent in monopoly pricing and, more relevant to the present
problem, because absence of competition removes the incentive to
achieve efficient utilization of resources in pursuing the task at
217
hand.
Competition can, of course, be wasteful and inefficient,
but our national commitment to the market and competition
suggests that it is better to err by permitting competition than to
assume that some centralized control will match the invisible hand
218
in assuring both allocative and productive efficiencies.
While we do not usually view law enforcement as a competitive
enterprise, there has often been competition between different
jurisdictions for the law enforcement service they are producing.
Federalism itself necessarily envisions a kind of competition. Some
of this competition is in law production, with different jurisdictions
enacting different laws. In the United States, this competition is
219
220
regulated by the notion of enumerated powers and preemption
217. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 2001).
[E]conomic theory provides a solid basis for the belief that monopoly
pricing, which results when firms create an artificial scarcity of their
product and thereby drive price above its level under competition, is
presumptively inefficient in the sense most commonly used by
economists in discussing issues of monopoly and competition (the
Kaldor-Hicks, or potential Pareto, sense of efficiency). Since efficiency
is an important social value, this conclusion establishes a prima facie
case for having an antitrust policy. It also implies the limitations of
that policy: to the extent that efficiency is the goal of antitrust
enforcement, there is no justification for carrying enforcement into
areas where competition is less efficient than monopoly because the
costs of monopoly pricing are outweighed by the economies of
centralized production in one or a very few firms. That is why I
referred to monopoly pricing as “presumptively” inefficient and as
creating merely a “prima facie” case for having an antitrust policy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
218. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958)
(“[U]nrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of
our economic resources . . . .”).
219. Federalism, in the context of the Tenth Amendment, refers to the
division of powers between the state and federal governments. U.S. CONST.
amend. X. Specifically, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” Id. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), the Court held that the Tenth Amendment imposes a limit on Congress’s
power. According to the Court, “the preservation of the States, and the
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(in regulating competition between the states and the federal
government) and by a variety of mechanisms, including the full
221
222
faith and credit clause, the privileges and immunities clause,
223
224
the right to travel, and the dormant commerce clause (in
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the
National Government.” Id. at 162 (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725
(1869)). Therefore, “Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.’ ” Id. at 161 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in
original) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S.
264, 268 (1981).
220. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, “federal law will
preempt any state law with which there is a conflict if Congress intends such a
result.” Francis J. Facciolo & Richard L. Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable: The
Continuing Viability of State Law Claims in the Face of Primary Jurisdiction and
Preemption Challenges Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 525, 531; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-26, at 491 (2d ed. 1988) (“Generally speaking,
the Court has come to sanction state regulations that supplement federal efforts so
long as compliance with the letter or effectuation of the purpose of the federal
enactment is not likely to be significantly impeded by the state law.”).
221. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”).
222. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states.”).
223. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (“[T]he nature
of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our
land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or
restrict this movement.”).
224. In absence of affirmative consent, a congressional negative will be
presumed against state action that in its effect upon interstate commerce
constitutes an unreasonable burden or interference. The dormant commerce
clause thus assumes that Congress prohibits state action until or unless it
authorizes it. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194-95
(1994) (holding that a state tax imposed on both local and out-of-state dairy
farmers was unconstitutional because the revenue received from the tax was used
to subsidize only local, in-state farmers, thus giving them an advantage over out-ofstate farmers); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394
(1994) (holding that an ordinance subsidizing a private waste transfer station was
unconstitutional because while the immediate effect was to direct local transport
of waste to a designated site within the local jurisdiction, its economic effects were
interstate in reach); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S 617, 629 (1978)
(holding that a New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of out-of-state waste
was unconstitutional); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333,
352-54 (1977) (holding that a state statute requiring all apples sold or shipped in
the state to use a USDA quality label was unconstitutional); cf. Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1978) (holding that a state statute
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regulating competition among the states in law production).
Other competition is in law enforcement—either of the same
laws, where different enforcers can bring suits challenging the
same conduct under the same statute, or of different but analog
laws with different enforcers being authorized under different
regimes to attack the same or very similar conduct. Although some
statutes permitting private suit introduce yet another set of entrants
in the law enforcement market, the current focus is on maximizing
the efficiency of law enforcement by state authorities, typically the
state attorney general.
2. Citizen Participation in Government
Active participation by citizens is “a means of strengthening
the representativeness of governmental institutions and enhancing
225
the perception of its legitimacy.” When government operates on
a smaller scale, “individuals can participate more effectively and
226
more directly.” If citizens are able to organize at the local or state
227
level, they can have a greater influence at the federal level. This
can help combat against interest groups lobbying the federal
government to get certain self-serving legislation passed or held up.
Proximity is also believed to “increase[] access,
communication, and accountability between citizens and public
228
In a system where dual regulation exists, citizens are
officials.”
better able to participate in market enforcement. For example,
Spitzer’s investigation into the mutual funds was the result of a
229
“whistle-blower’s tip.”
It is unclear whether that same person
attempted to contact the SEC and was stonewalled or whether only
state officials were contacted. Regardless, state officials were the
ones who received and acted on the tip.
Additionally, political accountability supports the argument for
providing that a producer or refiner of petroleum products could not operate a
retail service station within the state was constitutional because the fact that a
burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself,
establish a claim that the statute violates the constitution).
225. Jorde, supra note 216, at 231 (internal citations omitted). See generally
Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory
Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997).
226. See Jorde, supra note 216, at 231.
227. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110
YALE L.J. 947, 999 (2001).
228. See Jorde, supra note 216, at 231.
229. See Atlas, supra note 1.
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dual enforcement. Neither the state nor the federal government
wants to be seen as allowing market abuses to occur at the expense
of the investing public because they will be held accountable for
their actions, or inaction. The inevitable result is a regulatory
competition between the state and federal government to see who
can eliminate potential market abuses. This will promote investors’
interests and the integrity of the market as a whole.
3. Efficiency in Government
Allowing state enforcement of securities regulations as a
secondary enforcement mechanism means that only fifty attorneys
general could potentially bring suit for violation of securities laws.
The scope of state enforcement is not unlimited. Concededly,
allowing private rights of action in these types of situations could
very well lead to inefficient uses of resources and time. This article,
however, is limited to state enforcement by the attorneys general.
Additionally, the existence of overlapping state and federal
jurisdiction does not mean that both the state and federal
government will take action in any given situation, as evidenced by
the recent mutual fund scandal. Overlapping jurisdiction did exist
but it was far from being inefficient. To begin with, the federal
government did not take any action until after the states had spent
their own resources investigating and uncovering the scandal.
Thus, there was no initial cost attributed to the federal government
as enforcer because the federal government was not involved until
much later in the process. Moreover, the existence of prosecutorial
discretion necessarily means that overlapping jurisdiction does not
necessarily result in duplicative enforcement.
Dual regulation also results in government efficiency because a
national securities regulator would possess “neither the systematic
knowledge of local conditions nor the flexibility required for wise
230
administration.”
In contrast, “[s]tates and localities are sensitive
230. See Jorde, supra note 216, at 232.
A recent example illustrating the importance of dual regulation is the financial
demise of Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities, a financial services firm in
Spokane, Washington, and its subsidiary, Summit Securities.
Gretchen
Morgenson, Call In the Feds. Uh, Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, at 3-1.
Metropolitan Mortgage was a financial firm known for its dependability and many
Washington residents invested in securities issued by the company.
Id.
Unfortunately, about 35,000 local investors have lost significant amounts of money
in the last few months. Id. “[L]ate last year, Metropolitan and . . . Summit . . .
stopped paying interest on some $600 million of securities . . . .” Id. Then, in
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231

to local interest and residents.”
States are more likely to be
concerned with local interests that might otherwise be missed by
the SEC and the federal government. Although the mutual fund
scandal is arguably of national interest, many of the firms involved
do business in New York City. This supports the argument that
Spitzer’s actions were part of an effort to protect the interests of the
citizens of New York, and that states are often more in tune with
local interests than the federal government.
Assuming that some inefficiencies do exist here, the benefits of
dual regulation outweigh any costs. The SEC, in response to the
recent mutual fund scandal, issued proposals that “would require
more independent directors, . . . require directors of funds to
perform annual evaluations of their effectiveness, and would
permit [directors] to hire their own staff so they would not rely too
232
heavily on the fund’s investment advisors.”
These new proposals
would not have been issued if the states had not brought the
scandal to light. Additionally, Congress “is considering its own
measures to beef up penalties for mutual fund fraud, amid concern
233
the SEC was slow to act.”
If state enforcement can drive a
national effort for reform, the benefits are clear—investor

January of 2004, “Ernst & Young, the companies’ auditor, resigned, saying it had
found ‘material misstatements’ in their financial reports going back three years.”
Id. Finally, on February 4, both Metropolitan and Summit filed for bankruptcy
protection. Id.
One investor was understandably upset by the firm’s sudden demise: “The
company looked like a good company . . . everybody trusted what they were being
told. . . . With people’s money at stake, where in heck were the regulators at, and
the people who are supposed to keep an eye on this?” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). The question is a fair question and the answer is that the regulators
were in Washington. Id. “Because of a federal law intended to streamline
securities regulation, the toughest cops on Metropolitan’s turf—officials in
Washington State’s department of financial institutions—were essentially taken off
the beat in 2000.” Id. Thus, state regulators, “who had kept Metropolitan on a
short leash, could only watch . . . as the company sold more securities . . . than it
could easily repay.” Id.
This is exactly the kind of situation that calls for there to be both state and federal
regulation of the securities industry. It lends support to the argument that
“federal regulators have recently been less vigilant than some of their state
counterparts in supervising financial companies.” Id.
231. See Ulen, supra note 183, at 946.
232. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Outlines Plan for Tightening Grip on Mutual Funds,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at C1.
233. SEC, Under Fire, Outlines New Fund Rules (Nov. 18, 2003), at
http://www.boston.com:80/business/articles/2003/11/18/sec_under_fire_outlin
es_new_fund_rules (last visited May 15, 2004).
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confidence and the integrity of the market are strengthened by
aggressive state action leading to national reforms.
4. Creative Experimentation
Decentralization, the result of having a dual regulatory system,
allows for greater experimentation to satisfy local interests and
234
In celebrating the potential role of the states, Justice
needs.
Brandeis once stated, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic
235
“The
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”
opportunity for creative experimentation, innovation, and
invention is probably most important [when] economic activity [is
236
involved].”
“Economies are dynamic and change is often fast237
paced.”
“Economic federalism permits states to respond rapidly
and in a variety of ways to perceived market and regulatory
238
Allowing the states to develop different, and perhaps
needs.”
more effective, regulatory mechanisms to protect the integrity of
the securities market will ultimately benefit the investing public.
Should a state create a more effective system than that of another
state, or of the federal government, the latter jurisdictions can
benefit by adapting their own systems to make them more effective.
5. Diffusion of Power
Finally, dual sovereignty and limited central government
239
promote the sharing of governmental control.
A balance of
power between governments reduces risk of abuse, thereby helping
240
reduce potential inefficiencies. As noted by Justice Powell:
234. See Bellia, supra note 227, at 999-1000 (arguing that federalism “serves the
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society and promotes experimentation with
different programs”); see also Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 225, at 1217-18.
235. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 95 (citing Justice Brandeis’s dissenting
opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)).
236. See Jorde, supra note 216, at 233.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997) (stating that the
system designed by the Framers is one in which federal and state governments
exercise concurrent authority, rather than the federal government acting through
the states); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (stating that “the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to
require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions”).
240. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921.
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The Framers believed that the separate sphere of
sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the
States would serve as an effective “counterpoise” to the
power of the Federal Government. The States would serve
this essential role because they would attract and retain
the loyalty of their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the
Founders thought, were found in the objects peculiar to
241
state government.
A dual regulatory system protects against the reality that the federal
government is not, and cannot, always protect the investing public.
Eliminating the possibility of state enforcement of securities laws
takes away a strong alternative means of enforcement. Given the
savvy nature of the key players in the securities markets today,
eliminating the only feasible alternate method of enforcement is
not in the best interests of the investing public.
VIII. CONCLUSION
States do have an important role to play in the enforcement of
securities laws because of the limitations placed on the federal
government by the public choice theory. An alternative method of
enforcement is needed for the following scenarios: 1) instances in
which federal regulation is too lax, and 2) instances in which state
action can highlight gaps in federal enforcement either because
gaps exist in the regulations themselves, or because the federal
government is not aware of certain abuses of the market. When
state action is used as an alternative means of enforcement, as done
by Eliot Spitzer in New York, the investing public can reap the
benefits of this state action. Where state action does not fit into the
above model but is instead similar to the actions taken by Drew
Edmondson in Oklahoma, state action is duplicative, costly, and
largely ineffective. It is this latter form of state action—based solely
on personal distaste for what is an informed decision by the SEC to
not bring charges against Bernard Ebbers and to allow WorldCom
to enter Chapter 11 proceedings—that fuels the arguments against
allowing state enforcement of securities laws.

241. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 571 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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